The Birth of German Biotechnology Industry – Did Venture Capital run the show? by Dirk Engel et al.
Claire Champenois,Dirk Engel
and Oliver Heneric


























Prof. Dr. Christoph M. Schmidt, Ph.D. (President),
Prof. Dr. Thomas K. Bauer
Prof. Dr. Wim Kösters
Governing Board:
Heinrich Frommknecht (Chairman);
Eberhard Heinke,Dr. Dietmar Kuhnt,Dr.Henning Osthues-Albrecht
(Vice Chairmen);
Prof.Dr.-Ing.Dieter Ameling,Manfred Breuer,Prof.Dr.Walter Eberhard,
Prof. Dr.Harald B. Giesel,Marianne Halstrick-Schwenk,Dr.Thomas Köster,
Hartmut Krebs,Rolf Hermann Nienaber,Heinz Putzhammer,
Dr. Günter Sandermann,Dr.Gerd Willamowski
Advisory Board:
Prof.David Card,Ph.D.,Prof.Dr.Clemens Fuest,Prof.Dr.Walter Krämer,
Prof. Dr.Michael Lechner,Prof.Dr.Till Requate,Prof.Nina Smith, Ph.D.,
Prof. Dr.Harald Uhlig,Prof.Dr.Josef Zweimüller
RWI : Discussion Papers
No. 16
Published by Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung,
Hohenzollernstrasse 1/3,D-45128 Essen,Phone +49 (0) 201/81 49-0
All rights reserved.Essen,Germany,2004
Editor:Prof.Dr.Christoph M.Schmidt,Ph.D.
ISSN 1612-3565 – ISBN 3-936454-29-9
The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress
circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments.Views expressed
represent exclusively the authors’own opinions and do not necessarily
reflect those of the RWI.RWI : Discussion Papers
No. 16
Claire Champenois, Dirk Engel and Oliver Heneric
RWI
ESSENBibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek
Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen
Nationalbibliografie;detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet
über http://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar.
Financial support from the German Science Foundation (DFG) under the
grant STA 169/10-1 is gratefully acknowledged.
ISSN 1612-3565
ISBN 3-936454-29-9Claire Champenois, Dirk Engel and Oliver Heneric*
The Birth of German Biotechnology Industry –
Did Venture Capital run the show?
Abstract
We answer the questions,how many firms acting in the modern German bio-
technologyindustryarefundedbyventurecapitalcompanies(VCC)aswellas
equity funded by corporate investors.The theory suggests a high relevance of
VCC as venturing partner of high-tech projects.In addition we argue that cor-





percent of all healthcare developer in the early stage are venture-backed
firms,only a small share of low-risk projects received venture capital.The re-
sultsforcorporateinvestorsarereversible.Fewerhigh-techprojectsandmore
low-risk projects compared to VCC are equity financed by corporate inves-
tors. The econometric analysis suggests that the observed pattern is mainly
driven by the level of project risk and hence,supports all our hypotheses.
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The literature emphasizes the crucial importance of venture capital to reduce
the funding gap of young high-tech firms carrying out a lot of R&D activities.
In analogy,the development process of a new high-tech industry,i.e.the mod-




venturing partners. Biotechnology offers an example of a recent booming
high-technology industry, in which Germany gradually caught up with the
leading countries in Europe.
Beside the expected high relevance of VCC, theoretical arguments suggest
thatcorporateinvestorsavoidtobeaventuringpartneroffirmswithhigh-risk
projects.Reasons for that are the higher risk-adversity of corporate investors,
the higher attractiveness of alternative strategies such as collaborations, and
the preferences of the biotechnology firms for VCC. On the contrary, incum-
bents are confronted with some opportunities in the low-risk area of the bio-
technology industry to secure an optimal supply for the current product pipe-
line.We emphasize the OECD-definition of biotechnological industry to con-
sider the wide range of technological and entrepreneurial opportunities
within the sector and hence, to test our hypotheses. The empirical analysis is
based on 378 biotechnology firms, founded between 1995 and 1999, in the
ZEW-Foundation Panels.
Our results emphasize a crucial importance of the access to venture capital
provided by venture capital companies:VCC are venturing partner of 42 per-
centofhealthcaredeveloperintheirearlystage.Oppositetothatbutinaccor-
dance with our expectations, corporate investors are marginally involved as
venturing partner of high-risk projects.Our multivariate analysis further sug-
gest that the observed pattern is mainly driven by the level of project risk and
hence,support all our hypotheses.Product and service firms in the healthcare
sectorhaveasignificanthigherprobabilitytoreceiveventurecapitalthansup-
pliers,whereasspecializedsuppliersinallbiotechnologyfields(red,greenand
gray) are significantly more favored by corporate investors.
1. Introduction
Venture capital seems to be best instrument suited to reduce the funding gap
of young high-tech firms (Amit et al.1998;Carpenter,Petersen 2002).Access
to equity partners may have considerable economic benefits,measured by the
number of new patent applications and firm performance (e.g. Powell et al.
1999;Kortum,Lerner2000;Engel,Keilbach2002).Policymakersandscientific
4 Claire Champenois, Dirk Engel and Oliver Henericscholars expect that the availability of venture capital is a driving force in the
creation process of a new industry and they undertake considerable efforts to
secure best conditions for venture capital investments. Against this back-
ground,this paper analyzes the frequency of the equity funding of firms in the
German biotechnology industry and investigates the determinants of the ob-
served pattern.
Existing studies highlight the role of VCC measured by the number and the
amount of investments or analyze a specific segment of biotechnology firms
(Ernst & Young 2002). To our knowledge, a comprehensive study about the
relevanceofdifferentventuringpartners,however,ismissing.1Further,weex-
pectthattheimportanceofVCCandcorporateinvestorsasventuringpartner
differs according to the project risk and targeted markets of biotechnology
firm. Besides the usual focus on high relevance of VCC for equity funding of
high-risk projects, theoretical arguments suggest that corporate investors
avoid to be a venturing partner of firms with high-risk projects. Opposite to
that,incumbents are confronted with some opportunities in the low-risk area
of the biotechnology industry to secure an optimal supply for the current
product pipeline.
We emphasize the OECD-definition2 of biotechnological industry to consider
the wide range of technological and entrepreneurial opportunities within the
sector.Germany’s biotechnology industry has evolved rapidly since 1995 and
has reached the top position in Europe concerning the number of biotechnol-
ogyfirmsin2000.Asubstantialincreaseinfirmcreationactivitiesistypicalfor
newindustries,offeringenormoustechnologicalandentrepreneurialopportu-
nities (Klepper 1996).The value chain within the biotechnology industry con-
tains high-risk projects (e.g.the development of new drugs and technology in-
tensive services) as well as low-risk projects (e.g.traditional services,biotech-
nology equipment).Platform technologies such as the Polymerase Chain Re-
action (PCR) technique are well known examples for the importance of tech-
nology intensive services that accelerate the development process.
Our descriptive analysis shows that VCC are very often venturing partner for
firms developing new drugs or platform technologies.They are of little impor-
tance to finance low-risk projects. The respective results for corporate inves-
tors emphasize that this type of investors avoid equity ventures in high-inno-
vativebiotechfirms.Theobservedpatternalsoholdsinamultivariateanalysis
which controls for some core variables as determinants of funding.
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1 Best anecdotal evidence is the study of Burg and Kenney (2000) who highlight the role of ven-
ture capitalists during the creation process of Local Area Networking (LAN) industry.
2 OECD Definition of Biotechnology: “The application of science and technology to living or-
ganisms,aswellasparts,productsandmodelsthereof,toalterlivingornon-livingmaterialsforthe
production of knowledge,goods and services”.Thepaperisorganizedasfollows:Insection2wehighlightthemotivesandin-
struments of VCC and corporate investors concerning their activities in the
biotechnologyindustry.Further,weformulatethehypothesesforempiricalin-
vestigation.The short description of the database in section 3 is followed by a
descriptiveanalysisoftheshareofventure-backedfirmsandtheshareoffirms
receivingequityfromcorporateinvestors.Theanalysisshedslightonthepref-
erences, i.e. the favored product strategy and targeted market, from venture
capitalists and corporate investors. Based on a multivariate analysis in sec-
tion 4 we check for a pseudo correlation of the observed pattern. The paper




projects require considerable financial resources. Development costs for a
new drug – from biological target identification to authorization to commer-
cialization–amountto$500milliononaverage(Ollig2001:24).Furthermore,
thesefinancialresourcesarerequiredoveralongperiodoftime.Therefore,in-
ternal finance appears to be an insufficient instrument for high-tech biotech-
nology firms. Significant sales are absent and the entrepreneur’s personal
funds are usually too small, as confirmed for example by an empirical study
carried out by Champenois3. Government R&D-subsidies4 as additional in-
ternal resource are very limited regarding the amount and intended purpose,
too. In addition, young high-tech firms have limited access to loans. The rea-
sons are information asymmetries, lack of sufficient collateral value and that
loansareunsuitabletopre-financeR&D-projects(Carpenter,Petersen2002).
The same is true for public loans.Their allocation depends on the readiness of
a financial institutions (private commercial banks,saving banks “Sparkassen”
and credit co-operatives “Genossenschaftsbanken”) to take over fully or
partly the default risk.According to Myers’ (1984,1986) pecking order theory,
firms escape to external equity, the last financial resource, to reduce the re-
markable funding gap for high-tech projects.
Equity investors can be divided into two categories: (i) a classical informal
one, comprising private investors well-known as “business angels” as well as
“corporate investors”and (ii) a recent formal one,consisting of newly created
VCC whose strategy is to buy and sell equity stakes of young firms. Business
6 Claire Champenois, Dirk Engel and Oliver Heneric
3 A(stillunpublished)empiricalinvestigationbyChampenoisshowedthatoutof18interviewed
high-innovative German biotechnology firms,50 percent had received founders’ funding (on top
of common capital stock),with a maximal value of 250,000 euro in a single case.
4 The first institutional subsidy was given in 1975 by a private foundation. In 1985 the German
Government presented its first program to foster biology and biotechnology.The most important
program was arranged in 1995 with the BioRegio contest.angels face the same market imperfections as banks regarding information
asymmetries.Furthermore,the finance amount required in biotechnology of-
ten exceeds their own capabilities.5 On the contrary, corporate investors and
VCC have greater financial capabilities than business angels.
The number and activities of VCC have substantially increased in Germany,
likeintherestofEurope,sincetheestablishmentandacceptanceofnewstock
markets in the mid-90’s.VCC seems to be best suited to deal with information
asymmetries that typically exist for high-tech projects. Risk-pooling, risk-di-
versification and specialization are the most popular arguments to derive ad-
vantagesofVCCoversingleinvestors(Chan1983;Amitetal.1998).VCCsyn-
dicate a lot of investments to overcome the limitations in fund raising, to
achieve sufficient diversification and to increase the quality of screening pro-
cedure(e.g.Bygrave1987;Branderetal.1999fordetails).VCCactasinterme-
diaries between outside investors and young innovative firms: They provide
funds as well as considerable management support and advice. Most of them
pursue a purely financial goal, which is maximizing their returns on invest-
ments.6 In the venture capitalists’ view, the expectation of high financial re-
turns is mainly correlated with the size and growth of markets targeted by the
young innovative firm.7
In the biotechnology industry, the healthcare – especially human medicine –
branch is the largest market for biotechnology firms and it is expected to grow
most significantly in the next years.Mainly due to population aging,the phar-
maceutical market is expected to rise worldwide from $ 300 billion in 1998 to
$980billionin2015(Ollig2001).Biotechnologytherapeuticproducts(likere-
combinant proteins or monoclonal antibodies) are expected to gain an in-
creasing market share,since their success rate in clinical trials is ahead of con-
ventional chemical compounds (Gambardella et al. 2000): at the end of the
90’s,biopharmaceuticalsrepresented10percentofthepharmaceuticalmarket
and 6 out of 10 newly approved drugs had been developed using biotechnol-
ogy methods;by 2015,the share of biopharmaceuticals should jump to 25 per-
cent,representingamarketof$200billion(Ollig2001).Inthediagnosticmar-
ket,biotechnologyinnovationsarealsoexpectedtogainmarketshares.Asop-
posed to the situation in the “red” biotechnology sector, the agricultural and
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5 Business angels select best proposals and invest on average 125,000 to 500,000 ¤ in a firm;Nat-
husius,2001.
6 The German venture capital market is characterized by different groups of venture capitalists:
Independent VC’s, private owned as well as public bank-owned VC’s (Engel 2004). Companies
fromthelastgrouptendtorequirelowerminimuminternalratesofreturnthantheothers.Corpo-
rate VCC are mostly members of VCC’ associations.Based on their origin and strategy we count
them to the group of corporate investors.
7 For an extensive discussion of VC investment criteria see, among others, Tyebjee, Bruno 1984
and MacMillan et al.1987.food market (“green” biotech) offers much less growth perspectives in
Europe, due to a low level of acceptance from users (farmers, consumers) as
well as difficulties experienced in the technology development,regulatory ap-
proval and adoption from the users processes.The market for environmental
applications (“gray” biotech) is viewed as being economically insignificant
compared to the two previous ones.
Asuccessfultechnologicalinnovationisoneofthekeyfactorsingainingasig-
nificant share of the targeted market. Venture capitalists particularly seek
“disruptive technologies”that offer a radically new solution to unsolved tech-
nical problems of the industry or make activities currently carried out by the
industry significantly easier or cheaper.The PCR technique is an example of a
disruptive technology. Before the discovery of this technology in 1985, scien-
tists wishing to copy DNA strands had to go through a laborious (days- or
weeks-long) procedure of inserting the DNA sequences into bacterial DNA,
growing large cultures of the sequence-carrying cells and, finally, harvesting
the desired DNA. PCR allowed them to produce in a few hours more than a
millioncopiesfromDNAsamplesinordertodiagnosegeneticdisordersorin-
fectiousdiseaseswithasampleofgeneticmaterialthatwouldhavebeenmuch
too small earlier.In conclusion,we derive our hypothesis 1:
H1: Firms developing new healthcare applications and new technology
platforms to develop these applications offer most attractive equity




ogy start-up. Two types of corporate investors can be differentiated. A first
group identifies biotechnology as a new market niche offering attractive op-
portunities for horizontal or vertical enlargement of incumbent’s business ac-
tivities to secure an optimal supply for the current product pipeline.Suppliers
like machine manufacturers may be a good example of such incumbents and
hence, corporate investors. Occupying a strategic market is characterized by
low risk of failure, because the demand for goods and services is well-known
when the new activity takes place in early stages of the economic value chain
process.
A second group seeks new products or new technologies in order to make
their own production process more efficient,to be present in new markets or
to remain present in existing markets (Schween 1996; McNally 1997). These
are objectives especially pursued by pharmaceutical and chemical industries.
These corporations face a situation of dependence regarding innovations that
have been developed by biotechnology firms and that became key to new
product developments and their own R&D activities (Hamdouch, Depret
8 Claire Champenois, Dirk Engel and Oliver Heneric2001; Buse 2000). Technologies like genomics, proteomics, high-throughput
screening, bioinformatics, for example, have established themselves as indus-
try standards for R&D activities and development of new therapeutics, diag-
nostic kits, plant crops, etc8. Furthermore, dependence over new biotechnol-
ogy technologies and products is particularly important in the healthcare sec-
tor,characterized by a high “innovation pressure”:for several years,pharma-
ceutical corporations have continuously proved unable to discover innovative
compounds(newchemicalormolecularentities)tomeettheirstrategicobjec-
tives in terms of revenues.9 There is a high pressure to innovate since numer-
ouspatentsonblockbusterdrugs–thefewonesgeneratingthemainrevenues
–aregoingtoexpireinthecomingyears,meaningalossofexclusivityonsales,
hence a drastic decrease in revenues for the pharmaceutical industry10.
To address this challenge and to use the window of opportunity,pharmaceuti-
cal corporations can choose between two instruments: alliances or equity in-
vestments.Large corporations are,however,relatively risk-adverse,since they
specialize their investments in a few technologies and markets (which repre-
sent a strong strategic impact), i.e. that they can seldom diversify their risks.
The high volatility of corporate venture capital activities (i.e. corporation-
ownedVCCtomakeequityinvestmentsininnovativefirms)canbeusedasan
empirical evidence of the risk-adversity of corporate investors. A significant
increaseincorporateventurecapital(CVC)activitieswasobservedonlyafter
independent VCC showed signs of success (Gompers,Lerner 1998;Gompers
2002)11.Thatistosay,CVCunitsaresecondtomoveinduringtheboomstages
of the venture capital cycle and first to remove themselves in recession stages.
SimilarobservationscanbemadeinGermany.MostCVC’activitiesstartedin
200012, three years later after the first substantial increase in fundraising and
investments on the VC market. Risk adversity varies with the corporation’s
size,the smaller incumbents are,the greater their risk-adversity.
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8 Following Hamdouch and Depret (2001:88),biotechnology represents the new innovation pa-
radigm for the pharmaceutical industry,replacing the old chemical paradigm that lead to a bottle-
neck in the discovery of therapeutic innovations.
9 Price Waterhouse Coopers (1998:4) point out:at the end of 1996,41 large pharmaceutical com-
panieshad350activecompounds(newmolecularentities)inclinicaltrials(PhaseIIorIII),which
translates into 167 new drugs until 2001, i.e. 0.81 drug per year per company. This lies far behind
their strategic goals,which are above 2 new drugs a year.
10 Between the end of the 90’s and 2006, 100 therapeutics representing revenues of $ 37 billion
are going to lose patent protection;Ollig 2001:64.
11 An above-average, dramatical decrease of CVC investments in the US market is evident in
2001 compared with the year before;Chesbrough 2002.
12 BVK(1998)statisticscountedfourCVCcompaniesasmembersfocusingonearlystageactivi-
ties in 1998 for the first time.The working group “CVC”with 15 members have been established
in February of 2002;BVK,2002a.Alliances with innovative biotechnology firms, namely in-licensing and/or
co-development collaborations, acquisition of successful firms allow corpo-
rate investors to meet their strategic goals and to minimize their risks. In the
first mentioned type of partnerships, incumbents couple financial payments
with success (milestones payments made by incumbents at achievement of
technological objectives; royalty payments – i.e. a given percentage of reve-
nues paid to the biotechnology firm when sales occur – coupled with market
success).Therefore,they can minimize the amount of their investment in case




vestors.A high preference for collaboration without equity investment is evi-
denced by aggregated data14 as well as Champenois’ empirical research.15 In-
cumbent’s risk-adversity, advantages of collaborations to meet their strategic
goals and strategic opportunities in the low-risk area of biotechnology indus-
try leads to our second hypothesis:
H2: Corporate investors namely pharmaceutical and chemical corporations
avoid equity funding of high-tech biotechnology firms in order to
finance the development of new products. On the contrary to that
opportunities in the low-risk area of biotechnology industry are more
frequently used from incumbents via equity investment.
In sum, three arguments seem to be crucial for the comparison of VCC and
corporate investors’ activities. First, from corporate investors’ point of view
equity funding of high-risk projects in the early stage is not the first best solu-
tion to use the window on opportunity.Second,VCC enjoy significant advan-
tages over single private equity investors,including corporate investors,when
high information asymmetries exist. Third and finally, R&D performing
biotech firms may have higher bargaining power in periods of easier access to
equity issues and hence,they prefer VCC as equity partner (Lerner et.al.1999
fordetaileddiscussion).Tosumup,wederiveourthirdhypothesisasfollows:
H3: VCC finance more high-tech firms via equity investments than
corporate investors.
10 Claire Champenois, Dirk Engel and Oliver Heneric
13 Risksoffailurealongthedrugdevelopmentprocessareveryhigh:outof10,000identifiedbio-
logical targets,only one will lead to a new drug on the market.
14 The number of biotechnology alliances for the 20 largest pharmaceutical companies has soa-
redfrom85between1990and1998to226inthe1997–1998period,andallianceswithpharmaceu-
tical industries accounted for 77 percent of total financing for biotechnology firms in 1998 in the
USA,compared to 13 percent in 1991;Nicholson 2002.
15 Thepreviouslymentionedqualitativeempiricalresearchrevealedthatoutof10newlycreated
biotechnology firms in Germany having signed strategic collaborations (i.e. involving licensing
and/or product co-development) with incumbents, only two have received equity funding from
their industrial partner.3. Database and Descriptive Results
Database and Identification of Equity Funding
We test our three hypotheses for the creation process of Germany’s modern
biotechnologyindustryinthemiddleofthe90’s,atthesametimeastheVC-in-
vestment activities went up rapidly.The BIOCOM Database 2000 is the start-
ingpointforourempiricalanalysis.Itcontainsinformationaboutfirmcharac-
teristics like business models defined via product strategy and targeted mar-
kets, patents and addresses of 1,205 biotechnology firms based in Germany.
However,the BIOCOM Database does not provide information on the pres-
enceandtypeofequityinvestors.Wehavegeneratedthisinformationbyusing
firm-specific data from the ZEW-Foundation Panel. This data has been pro-
vided by the largest German credit rating agency “Creditreform”(see Almus
et al.2000 for further explanations).We identified 89 percent of biotech firms
of BIOCOM Database in the ZEW-Foundation Panel.16
Foramajorityofbiotechfirms,theinformationintheZEW-FoundationPanel
wasdeliveredbetween1998and2000forthefirsttime.Analysisabouttherole
of equity investors at the foundation date only makes sense,if firms are young
at the time of data delivery. Here we can easily assume that shareholders at
foundation date are still active as a venturing partner. For very old firms the
probability for an exit of a venturing partner increases rapidly. Hence, we fo-
cus on biotechnology firms founded between 1995 and 1999. Finally, we ex-
clude derivative foundations (= existing business units within a firm turned
into a legally independent entity) as we ignore firms with more than 250 em-
ployees at the time of the foundation,resulting in sample of 378 firms.
WehaveidentifiedtheVCCbasedonacomputerassistedsearchformembers
of associations and for companies with obvious venture capital activities
(Engel 2004 for detailed information).17 The remaining companies holding a
venture on biotechnology firms count to the group of corporate investors.We
checked each record of venture by hand and re-coded some of them to ignore
liability based affiliations.18 CVC-units of incumbents are mostly member of
VC-associations and have to be re-classified to the group of corporate inves-
tors.Remarkable,wecouldnotdetectanyventureofwell-knownCVC-unitin
the middle of the 90’s.That’s not really surprising as we remember the irrele-
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16 Identification based on a computer-assisted search for names and address of biotechnology
firms in ZEW-Foundation Panel (state: June 2002, means practically that most of ventures until
the middle of 2001 are identified) which is widely used in other studies.
17 Silent partnerships cannot be identified with this kind of procedure. They concern the rela-
tionshipbetweentwoormorepartnersinsideafirm,arenotrecordedinthetraderegisteranddif-
ficulttoobservebyCreditreform.Fortunately,exclusivelysilentpartnershipsdon’tplayanimpor-
tant role in early stage financing of venture capital companies;BVK 2002b:24,31,45.
18 Remember the following case: A management company is the owner of the biotechnology
firm to save the tangable and intangable assets in case of bankruptcy.vance of formal CVC-units in the middle of 90’s.As a result,we can differenti-
ate between four states of funding and hence, detect for alternatives for
biotech companies:
– equity funding exclusively by VCC (“Venture capital”),
– equity funding exclusively by corporate investors (“Corporate investor”),
– equity funding jointly by VCC and corporate investors (“Venture capital &
corporate investor”),
– equity funding is not detected (“Independent company”).
Equity Funding of Biotechnology Firms:Descriptive Results
BeforeweanalyzeempiricallytheroleofVCCandcorporateinvestorsasven-
turingpartners,wefirstaimatdescribingthemethodologytoclassifydifferent
business models19 of biotechnology firms, namely according to the level of
project risk and targeted markets.
Based on BIOCOM database we can distinguish between three different car-
dinal points in the value chain of biotechnology industry and classify firms ac-
cordingly into three categories:
1. Product firm – high level of project risk on average
2. Service firm – medium level of project risk on average
3. Supplier firm – low level of project risk on average.
Product firms engage in the R&D of primarily cell-based technologies in or-
der to develop new healthcare,agriculture or environment products.They are
confronted with a high level of risk and uncertainty about the success of prod-
uct development. The products can be therapeutics against major diseases
(like Alzheimer’s, Cancer, High Cholesterol, HIV or Parkinson’s), diagnostic
kits,vaccine,tissue engineering systems,in the red sector,or genetically modi-
fiedseeds,inthegreensector.ServicefirmssupportandtrytofostertheR&D
process of biotechnology firms as well as chemical or pharmaceutical firms.
Most of the so-called platform technology firms are to be found in this group.
They provide Protein or DNA sequencing, screening, target validation, assay
development services or molecular biology analysis. Based on differences in
the national institutional framework, Germany is more focused on the use of
this kind of technology compared to the UK biotechnology industry (Casper,
Kettler 2001). A second group are the “traditional” technical services or
non-technical services such as consulting activities e.g. regulatory support in
the course of product development or administration of external documents
and monitoring of proceedings. Unfortunately, the BIOCOM database does
12 Claire Champenois, Dirk Engel and Oliver Heneric
19 A description of business model includes in general the components of the business, the
functions of the business,and the revenues and expenses that the business generates.On the con-
trary to that we focus on specific characteristics.not differentiate between firms developing platform technologies and firms
offering traditional services. The supplier firms are responsible for the needs
of the modern laboratory.They provide pipette products,calibration services,
biotechnology equipment or production facilities. They have the lowest level
ofriskonaverage,meaningthatafewprojectscanbeveryrisky,butthemajor-
ity is confronted with a low level of risk.
We test empirically our classification in three categories based on descriptive
statistics, test and simple regressions. Typically, high-risk projects are charac-
terized by above-average innovativeness and a high standard deviation of
growth.The descriptive statistics for our proxy variables annual employment
growth rate and patent according the product strategy,presented in ,and tests
confirm our classification. Median of employment growth rate and mean of
patent significantly differs between the groups.Further,results are hold as we
take into account some more determinants for growth and innovativeness in
an unreported multivariate analysis.
In our empirical analysis, complexity arose through the fact that a given firm
could be registered in our database under several product strategies such as
product and service firm. Seven different combinations of product strategies
are possible and are taken into account in the multivariate analysis.20 To re-
ceive a better accuracy of discrimination,we restricted the number of combi-
nations to three in the descriptive analysis. The first category, product firms,
contain firms which only develop new products.The second one,service firms,
encompassesfirmsthateitherofferservicesonlyorservicesandnewproducts.
The last group, supplier firms, contain the remaining firms (Table 2). Table 3
emphasizes that the majority of firms targets the medicine,healthcare market.
About the half of all biotech firms are classified as suppliers, the category of
low level of risk on average.
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Differences in measures for risk-chance profile of biotechnology firms
Product
strategy








Product firm 37,3 25,2 49,9 0,556 0,503
Service firm 29,9 24,4 37,8 0,444 0,499
Supplier firm 16,2 2,7 34,0 0,297 0,459
Remark:Significant differences between risk measures for product or service firms on the
one hand and supplier firms on the other hand are detected for the median of employment




20 Product development has a different meaning in the context of drug development compared
to the context of an supplier firm and hence, emphasize the disaggregation and classification as
above mentioned.A significant share of biotechnology firms count to the group of ven-
ture-backed firms (Table 4): 15.6 percent of all biotechnology firms founded
between 1995 and 1999 exclusively received venture capital, 10 percent were
equity funded by corporate investors and 2.6 percent were jointly equity fi-
nanced by VCC and corporate investors.
More interesting, Table 4 indicates major differences according the three
classes of risk. The scopes of product firms are deeply in the focus of venture
capital companies:30.9 percent of them received equity from venture capital-
ists exclusively and 3.6 per cent are mixed funded by VCC and corporate in-
vestors.Corporate investors funding is of little importance.In addition to syn-
dicated funding with VCC, they started a stand alone early stage venture on
3.6percentofallproductdevelopers.Aremarkableshareofproductfirmsuse
onlyfinancialresourceswhichhasnothingtodowithventurecapitalorequity
funding by corporate investors. The clear orientation of VCC on product de-
veloper in red biotechnology is empirically suggested, too. About 42 percent
of the product firms in red biotechnology received venture capital exclusively
from VCC or in cooperation of VCC with corporate investor. From VCC’
pointofviewaremarkablehighshareofinterestingprojectswithpotentialfor
14 Claire Champenois, Dirk Engel and Oliver Heneric
Aggregation of firm’s product strategy to three classes for the descriptive analysis
Developing
new products
Offering services Supplier activities Class # obs.
1 0 0 Product firm 55
0 1 0 Service firm 71
1 1 0 Service firm 68
0 0 1 Supplier firm 82
0 1 1 Supplier firm 36
1 0 1 Supplier firm 33
1 1 1 Supplier firm 33




Product strategy and targeted markets of biotechnology firms in Germany
Founded between 1995 and 1999
Red Green Gray Unknown # obs.
Product firm 45721 5 5
Service firm 116 10 7 6 139
Supplier firm 142 11 10 21 184
Number of firms 303 28 19 28 378
Source: ZEW-Foundation Panels, BIOCOM Database 2000. – Remark: “Red” indicates
market for health care,“Green”indicates the agricultural and food market and “Gray”in-




vice firms are venture-backed firms. Suppliers are financed by VCC only in
few cases.
Tosumup,VCCfavorhigh-riskprojectsinthefieldofhealthcareapplications
which are even more attractive than investments in other fields. Further, we
detect a low importance of equity funding by corporate investors within the
high-tech biotechnology industry. The share of funded firms is much lower
compared with venture capitalists. The descriptive analysis confirms our hy-
pothesis 3, VCC undertake more equity investments in high-tech firms than
corporate investors. In contrast, a high rate of participation by corporate in-




A considerable limitation of the descriptive analysis is that we can only de-
scribe the role of VCC and corporate investors as equity partners differenti-
ated by the level of project.The differences in the presence of equity partners
inhighandlow-riskprojectscanpotentiallybeaffectedbydifferencesinother
variables e.g. founder’s knowledge. The empirical test of hypothesis 1 and 2
needs to control for effects resulting from differences in other variables. An
appropriate method for doing that is the multinomial logit model (MNL) (e.g.
Greene 1997: 915f.). Typically, MNL’s starting point is the choice between al-
ternatives conditioned on a vector of exogenous variables (e.g. level of risk,
founder’s knowledge).21 We differentiate between three alternatives instead
of four, now. Reasoned by insufficient number of cases for choice “Venture
capital & corporate investor” we added jointly financing to the choice
“VC-company”and alternatively to the choice “Corporate Investor”.
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Venturing partner according to product strategy








Venture Capital 30.9 21.5 6.5 15.6
Venture Capital &
Corporate investor 3.6 5.0 0.5 2.6
Corporate investor 3.6 7.9 13.5 10.0
None 61.8 65.4 79.3 71.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number of firms 55 139 184 378
Source:ZEW-Foundation Panels,BIOCOM Database 2000.
Table 4
RWI
ESSENAn assumption of the econometric model is that the error terms are inde-
pendentandidenticallytypeIextremevaluedistributed.Thisimpliesasevere
restriction for our empirical model,which is known as the independence of ir-
relevant alternatives (IIA). According to the IIA, the ratios of the probabili-
ties of any two choices do not depend on the presence of other choices in the
choice set.The IIA assumption is tested using the test suggested by Hausman
and McFadden (1984).We checked the independence of alternatives “Corpo-
rate investor” and “Independent” from the presence of venture capital as we
exclude alternative “Venture capital” from the model. In similar manner we
ignore alternative “Corporate investor” to check the changes in the ratios of
theprobabilities“Venturecapital”and“Independent”.Theteststatistic,how-
ever, is undefined because the variance-covariance matrix of the estimators
does not satisfy the asymptotic properties of the test.Therefore we derive the
simultaneous distribution of estimators (command suest in STATA 8.0). Ac-
cording Hausman and McFadden (1984) we now test whether parameter esti-
mates of each two-alternative model is equal to estimates of the full model.
The unreported results suggest that IIA could not be rejected in our model.
Thus,we can conclude that the disturbances in our model are independent.
Estimation Results
Table 5 contains the descriptive statistics for considered variables,Table 6 and
Table7 showtheresultsofMNL-Estimation.Wepresentcoefficientestimates
as well as marginal effects.Marginal effects allow a statement about the mag-
nitude of the relation between each exogenous variable and the probability to
acquire a specific venturing partner.They indicate probability changes in per-
centage points if the value of an indicator variable changes from zero to one.
Variables of main interest are listed in the first rows. Control variables are
listed under the heading “Other Firm Characteristics”.
The results based on the differentiation of firms according product strategy
and targeted markets are related to the reference group.The reference group
contains firms which only deal with supplying activities. Further we count
firms to the reference group which deal with supplying activities and offering
servicesbecauseearlierregressionsemphasizethatpointestimatesdonotdif-
fer from reference group. Firms which develop new products or firms which
offer services seem to be best suited to receive venture capital compared to
the reference group.The marginal effects emphasize a remarkable difference
inprobabilities.Forinstance,firmswhichonlydevelopnewproductsachievea
37 percent points higher probability to be funded via VC compared to firms in
the reference group.Further,firm’s orientation on the healthcare sector offer
bestchancestoacquireaVCCasequitypartnercomparedtofirmswithactivi-
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21 Choice has to be interpreted as realized alternative,resulting from the supply and demand for
equity funding.We consider an one stage game,because asking for equity yes or not is unobserva-
ble.ties in the field of green or gray biotechnology. An alternative specification
considerstheinteractionbetweenbothvariables.Thecoefficientestimatesare
significant higher when we take an interaction term,product and service firms
intheredbiotechnologyarea,intoaccount.Theresultsconfirmclearlyourhy-
pothesis 1, VCC are strongly oriented in financing high-risk projects in large
sized markets with best opportunities for growth.
Contrarytothat,productandservicefirmshaveasignificantlowerprobability
to acquire corporate investors as venturing partner than supplier firms. The
marginal effects quantify the extent of lower probability between minus 5.5
and minus 8.7 percent points.Strikingly,firms’ targeted market doesn’t matter
to gain a corporate investors more successfully. Corporate investors avoid
equity financing of high-risk projects and use opportunities in the low-risk
area to secure an optimal supply for current product pipeline.Both empirical
results confirm our hypothesis 2.
The results are very similar as we count the syndicated investments by VCC
and corporate investor to the group of corporate investors, alternatively (Ta-
ble 7). Now, a significant lower probability of firms in the category “Offering
Services” to achieve equity funding by corporate investors can not be ob-
served.Theresultsgivesomeevidenceforthecrucialcontributionofcommon
project evaluation by VCC and corporate investors within the area of
high-tech projects. Corporate investors are more willing to undertake equity
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Descriptive statistics of exogenous variables
Exogenous variables Mean Standard deviation
Product strategy and targeted markets1
Developing new products 0.139 0.346
Offering services 0.189 0.392
Supplying activities and developing new products 0.088 0.284
Offering services and developing new products 0.181 0.386
Supplying activities,offering services and devel-
oping new products 0.088 0.284
Targeted markets:red biotechnology 0.800 0.401
Other firm characteristics2
Doctor/Professor 0.616 0.487
Team foundation 0.451 0.498





Number of observations 375
Remark: 1BIOCOM database. – 2ZEW-Foundation Panel. Three observations are exclu-
ded because of missing data in “other firm characteristics”.
Table 5
RWI
ESSENinvestment in high-risk projects if financial intermediaries like VCC are in-
volved in project evaluation.The results confirm empirically that syndication
helps to reduce the risk of selecting a bad project if high information asymme-
tries exist (Locket,Wright 2001).
The remaining variables are discussed briefly. The presence of founders with
highaffinitytosciencemeasuredwiththetitle“Ph.D.”and“Professor”(inac-
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Determinants of the probability to be firm’s venturing partner
Base category:No venturing partner (# 270)
Exogenous variables
VC-company1 (67 obs.) Corporate investor (38 obs.)
coeff. dy/dx coeff. dy/dx
Product strategy and targeted markets












































































































Number of all observation 375
Log-Likelihood –232.14
Pseudo R² (Likelihood Ratio Index) 0.2025
Source:ZEW-Foundation Panels,BIOCOM Database 2000.– *Significant on the 10%-le-
vel; **Significant on the 5%-level; ***Significant on the 1%-level. – 1Syndicated invest-
ments between VC-company and corporate investor are included. Reference group: Firm
withsupplyingactivitiesexclusivelyorsupplyingactivitiesandofferingservices,ingreenor
gray business field,no Ph.D or professor within founder’s team,founded in 1995.dy/dx in-
dicates the marginal effect.Heteroscedastic robust standard errors in parantheses.
Table 6
RWI
ESSENcordance to Audretsch, Stephan 1996) increase firm’s probability to receive
venture capital. The reason is that they have access to more tacit knowledge
and can perform better in sense of innovation activities and firm growth
(Zucker et al. 1998, 2002). Biotechnology start-ups founded in 1997 and 1998
haveahigherprobabilitytoreceiveventurecapitalthanthosefoundedin1995
(the reference group). The pattern is mostly reasoned by the expectations of
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Determinants of the probability to be firm’s venturing partner
Base category:No venturing partner (# 270)
Exogenous variables
VC-company (57 obs.) Corporate investor1 (48 obs.)
coeff. dy/dx coeff. dy/dx
Product strategy and targeted markets
























































































1998 1.053 0.081 0.457 0.033













Number of all observation 375
Log-Likelihood –238.91
Pseudo R² (Likelihood Ratio Index) 0.1895
Source: ZEW-Foundation Panels, BIOCOM Database 2000. - *Significant on the 10%-le-
vel; **Significant on the 5%-level; ***Significant on the 1%-level. – 1Syndicated invest-
ments between VC-company and corporate investor are included. Reference group: Firm
withsupplyingactivitiesexclusivelyorsupplyingactivitiesandofferingservices,ingreenor
gray business field,no Ph.D or professor within founder’s team,founded in 1995.Heteros-
cedastic robust standard errors in parantheses.
Table 7
RWI
ESSENhigher return on investments in the end of the ninetees of the last century
compared to earlier years.The possibility to realize high prices for initial pub-
lic offerings of young firms with high potential of growth affect positively the
VCC’srateofreturnandhence,thewillingnessofinvestorstoinvestmoneyin
the funds of VCC (Brav, Gompers 1997; Lerner, Gompers 1998; Jeng, Wells
1998;Engel 2004 for empirical evidence).
Some sensitivity analyses are done to check the robustness of results. As we
consider firm size measured with number of employees the sample will be re-
duced of about 43 observations.We detect a nonlinear inverse U-shaped rela-
tionship between size and the probability to be funded by VCC or corporate
investor.We further considered variables on the level of counties to measure
region’s ability to generate most attractive investment opportunities and to
support the innovation process of biotechnology firms via co-operations and
informal network activities. Coefficients do not significantly differ from zero
andhence,wedonotfocusonthisvariables.Allsensitivityanalysesiscommon
that results for variables of main interest will be unchanged.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
The paper has focused on a comparison between activities of venture capital
companies and those of non-financial external companies to finance German
biotech start-ups founded between 1995 and 1999 in early stages.The descrip-
tive analysis emphasize a substantial importance of venture capital finance as
funding source for biotech firms developing new products and technologies in
the therapeutic and diagnostic fields,known as high-risk biotech firms.42 per-
cent of them received venture capital in early stage.In contrast,low-risk pro-
jects on average namely supplier firm were equity funded by venture capital-
ists to little extent.Someone could interpret the result for product firms in the
oppositedirection:Venturecapitalisnotimportant,because58percentdonot
have it. Two arguments speak against this interpretation. First, only a small
shareofallaskingfirmsreceiveventurecapitalreasonedbyasophisticatedse-
lection procedure of venture capitalists.Second,the share is higher compared
withhigh-techindustriesingeneral.Theshareofventure-backedfirmsrelated
to all young firms is about two percent in high-tech industries (Engel 2004).
The multivariate analysis emphasize that firm’s developing new drugs and
platform technologies have a higher probability to be equity funded than sup-
plierfirms.Theresultsofdescriptiveanalysisareholdinthemultivariateanal-
ysis if we consider some more determinants of funding.
Biotechnology firms developing new research technologies or products (diag-
nostic kits, therapeutic compounds – from target identification to pre-clinical
and clinical testing) are of special interest for incumbents in pharmaceutical
and chemical industry. However, our empirical results suggest that they are
20 Claire Champenois, Dirk Engel and Oliver Henericrarely active as venturing partners for these high-risk biotech firms. We be-
lieve that risk-adversity,higher attractiveness of alternative strategies such as
collaborations, acquisition in later stages and preferences of the biotechnol-
ogy firms are the main reason for this observation.Their strategy can be char-
acterized as a “wait-and-see”attitude or option model to be present in case of
a successful innovation process. Corporate investors’ (direct) contribution to
reduce the financing gap at the time of foundation is comparably low. How-
ever,their activities are an important signal for venture capitalists to evaluate
the market potential of business ideas and hence, indirectly affect the proba-
bility of closing the funding gap.Against this,corporate investors are more in-
volved as venturing partners in low-risk biotech firms based on attractive op-
portunities for horizontal or vertical enlargement of incumbent’s business ac-
tivities to secure an optimal supply for the current product pipeline. The
multivariate analysis confirm once again the result of descriptive analysis.
Venture capital is particularly important for early stage financing of high-risk
biotechnology firms.The result applies for a boom stage in the venture capital
cycle and the formative stage of the modern German biotechnology industry.
A lower importance of venture capital can be expected for biotechnology
firms founded after the year 2000. Nowadays, young and new biotechnology
firms are experiencing increasing difficulties in acquiring external equity after
the crash of the stock-markets.Venture capital companies tend to invest more
inlaterstagesandfocusonfollow-upinvestments.Furthermore,thequalityof
their selection procedure has increased drastically.Due to the significant role
of venture capital investments in the birth of the biotechnology industry, an
ongoing restraint from venture capitalist seems to be problematic for the fur-
ther development of existing biotech firms and the financing of new ones.The
messageforpolicymakersisclear:creationofnewindustries,thecommercial-
ization of “disruptive” technologies needs best conditions for venture capital
investments. Public support (e.g. tax advantages, public equity under private
management) can partly help to secure “baseline”investments in years of low
amounts of fund raising by VCC.
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